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and	Vietnamese	when	 they	coexisted	 in	 Indochina	during	 the	Second	World	War.	The	
French	 and	 the	 Japanese	 jointly	 ruled	 Indochina,	 due	 to	 their	 respective	 interests	 in	
preserving	 suzerainty	 and	 securing	 bases	 for	 the	 Pacific	 War.	 These	 two	 groups	
maintained	 constant	mutual	 awareness	 in	 this	 complicated	 and	 unstable	 relationship	
while	avoiding	conflict	and	seeking	the	support	of	the	Vietnamese	population.	However,	
despite	 efforts	 of	 French	 and	 Japanese	 authorities,	 the	 contradiction	 of	 mutual	
coexistence	 between	 France,	 as	 the	 “missionary	 of	 civilization,”	 and	 Japan,	 as	 the	
“liberator	 of	 Asia”	 from	 Western	 colonialism,	 could	 not	 be	 concealed.	 Whereas	 the	
Japanese	 government’s	 policy	 of	 “maintaining	 peace”	 in	 Indochina	 ensured	 that	
interactions	 between	 the	 Japanese	 and	 Vietnamese	 were	 limited,	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	 French	 and	 the	 Vietnamese	 shifted	 during	 this	 time,	 with	 the	 effect	 of	
stimulating	the	local	population’s	identity	and	leading	to	France	laying	the	groundwork	
for	postwar	decolonization.	By	examining	 the	quotidian	 facets	of	 the	Franco-Japanese	








During	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Indochina	 experienced	 the	 unique	 situation	 of	 being	
occupied	 by	 Japan	 while	 remaining	 a	 French	 colony.	 For	 four	 and	 a	 half	 years,	 the	
French	suzerain,	which	had	wielded	colonial	power	for	more	than	sixty	years,	coexisted	






invasion	 in	 its	 entirety	 deals	 with	 the	 topic	 from	 a	 largely	 Japanese	 perspective.	
Yoshizawa	 (1986)	 focuses	 on	 the	military	 aspects	 of	 the	 Japanese	 occupation	 in	 1940	
and	 1941,	 Tabuchi	 (1980;	 1981)	 discusses	 its	 economic	 implications,	 and	 numerous	
studies	by	Shiraishi	and	Furuta	 (1976),	Akagi	 (1984),	and	others	deal	with	 the	political	
intention	 behind	 Japan’s	 choice	 of	 seihitsuhoji),	 a	 policy	 of	 “preserving	 peace.”	 Nitz’s	
(1983;	 1984)	 interviews	 with	 the	 Japanese	military,	 diplomats,	 and	 civilians	 who	 had	
stayed	 in	 Indochina	at	 the	time,	 reveals	 the	association	between	the	 intentions	of	 the	
Japanese	 and	 the	 Vietnamese	 nationalists.	 Tachikawa’s	 (2000a)	 research	 emphasizes	
the	political,	economic,	and	military	“cooperation”	between	Japan	and	France,	whereas	
a	recent	work	by	Michelin	(2019)	offers	a	detailed	treatment	of	Japanese	intentions	and	
the	 negotiation	 with	 the	 French	 government	 regarding	 the	 process	 of	 the	 Japanese	
invasions	in	September	1940	and	July	1941.	It	discusses	the	implications	of	the	Japanese	
occupation	as	a	crucial	catalyst	to	the	subsequent	Pacific	War.	
L’Indochine	française,	1940–1945	 (Brocheux	 and	 Isoart	 1982)	was	 the	 first	 edited	
collection	 of	 articles	 to	 describe	 the	 Indochina	 of	 that	 era	 from	 diverse	 standpoints.	




work	of	Turpin	 (2005)	 focuses	on	 the	 involvement	of	Charles	de	Gaulle	and	de	Gaulle	
supporters	 in	 Indochina.	 Freud	 (2014)	 contributes	 to	 the	 relative	 paucity	 of	 research	
that	 draws	 on	 an	 economic	 perspective	 by	 elucidating	 the	 economic	 efforts	 of	 the	





auspices	 of	 the	 colonial	 authorities	 and	 their	 aftereffects	 continued	 to	 be	 felt	 after	




of	 perspectives.	 This	 article	 brings	 to	 the	 fore	 the	 quotidian	 elements	 of	 the	 colonial	
encounter	to	reveal	how	Franco-Japanese	rule	intersected	with	the	Vietnamese	people,	












France	 was	 defeated	 by	 Germany	 in	 June	 1940,	 and	 the	 Vichy	 government	 was	
established	under	Marshal	Philippe	Pétain	the	following	month.	The	Vichy	government	
planned	 to	 govern	 Indochina	 domestically	 through	 a	 national	 revolution,	mobilizing	 a	
repressive	antirepublican	political	movement.	In	the	ceasefire	agreement	with	Germany,	
France’s	 possession	 of	 its	 overseas	 empire	 was	 recognized.	 However,	 as	 the	 war	
expanded,	Indochina	became	separated	from	the	metropole	due	to	the	insecurity	of	the	
15,000-kilometer	maritime	routes	between	the	two	countries.	By	mid-1943,	the	rest	of	
France’s	 colonies	 had	 split	 off	 from	 the	 Vichy	 government	 and	 followed	 de	 Gaulle’s	
government-in-exile	(Thobie	et	al.	1990,	311–371).	However,	Indochina,	its	most	distant	
colony,	remained	under	Vichy	authority	throughout	the	war.	 	
Taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 German	 victory	 over	 France,	 Japan	 stationed	 troops	 in	
northern	Indochina	in	September	1940	to	secure	a	base	for	the	resolution	of	the	Second	
Sino-Japanese	 War	 (1937–1945).	 In	 July	 1941,	 the	 Japanese	 Army	 advanced	 to	 the	
southern	 part	 of	 Indochina	 to	 procure	 a	 vital	 jumping-off	 point	 for	 the	 invasion	 of	













for	 total	 occupation.	 Some	 people	 within	 the	 Japanese	 government,	 particularly	 the	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	pointed	out	 this	contradiction,	but	 they	were	overruled	by	
the	strong	urges	of	 the	army,	which	prioritized	 the	successful	undertaking	of	 the	war.	
Moreover,	 there	 was	 an	 entrenched	 concern	 that	 the	 Pacific	 War	 could	 assume	 the	











unlimited	 troops	 throughout	 Indochina.	 The	number	of	 Japanese	 troops	positioned	 in	
Indochina	 changed	 with	 the	 preparation,	 commencement,	 and	 continuation	 of	 the	
Pacific	War.	 The	 sixty	 thousand	 Japanese	 stationed	 there	before	 the	war	were	drawn	
down	after	 the	breakout	of	 the	Pacific	War,	but	because	 Indochina	continued	 to	be	a	
strategically	 vital	 stationing	 area,	 several	 units	were	 kept	 for	 defense.	 The	 billets	 and	
barracks	for	the	Japanese	Army,	established	far	from	urban	areas,	were	provided	by	the	
French.	
There	 were	 approximately	 thirty-nine	 thousand	 French	 in	 Indochina―about	 0.2	
percent	of	the	total	population	(Jennings	2001,	136)—and	they	were	shocked	to	learn	of	
the	June	1940	surrender	to	Germany.	The	French	residents	not	only	feared	the	fate	of	
their	 distant	 homeland	 but	 also	 had	 misgivings	 about	 the	 continuation	 of	 French	
colonial	rule	in	Indochina	where	they	had	made	their	home.	Their	memoirs	reveal	these	
concerns:	“In	addition	 to	 the	pain	 [of	defeat],	 there	was	one	overriding	concern.	How	
was	this	to	be	explained	to	the	locals?	What	do	they	think	of	us,	we	who	have	until	now	
expressed	our	effortless	superiority?…	In	order	not	to	be	losers	 like	ourselves,	 is	 it	not	
natural	for	them	to	wish	to	separate	from	us?”	(Bauchar	1946,	32).	 	





For	 myself	 and	 those	 who	 arrived	 with	 me,	 Indochina	 appears	 a	
paradise.	When	we	left	Marseilles	at	the	start	of	January	[1941],	France	
had	been	under	a	harsh	German	occupation	since	the	previous	July	and	




However,	 the	 Japanese	 threat	 was	 growing	 in	 Indochina.	 As	 of	 July	 1941,	 the	
Japanese	 Army	 was	 garrisoned	 throughout	 the	 whole	 territory.	 The	 French	 colonial	
authorities	 and	 most	 of	 the	 French	 population	 sought	 to	 somehow	 remain	 the	
legitimate	rulers	of	Indochina	until	the	end	of	the	war,	but	they	knew	they	could	not	win	
against	 the	 Japanese	 by	 force.	 The	 Battle	 of	 Lạng	 Sơn	 in	 September	 1940	 made	 the	
inferiority	 of	 the	 French	 military	 undeniable;	 while	 Japan	 and	 France	 were	 still	














or	 minor	 disagreements	 between	 individuals	 could	 escalate	 into	 larger	 conflicts	 and	
worsen	 relations.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 colonial	 government	 sought	 to	 prevent	 the	
Japanese	 from	 having	 any	 influence	 over	 the	 local	 population,	 an	 intention	 that	
unfolded	 into	 a	 subtle	 contest	 between	 the	 Japanese	 and	 the	 French.	 Kept	 from	
breaking	out	into	open	conflict,	the	former	proclaimed	their	own	presence	to	appeal	to	
locals	 and	 pressured	 the	 French,	 while	 the	 latter	 desperately	 sought	 to	 preserve	 the	
existing	social	structure.	
The	French	colonial	authorities	requested	that	the	first	landing	of	Japanese	troops	
at	 Haiphong	 in	 September	 1940	 take	 place	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 night	 to	 avoid	 the	
attention	 of	 the	 local	 population.	 During	 the	 stationing	 of	 troops	 in	 the	 south	 the	
following	 July,	 French	 colonial	 forces	 were	 prevented	 from	 leaving	 their	 barracks	 at	
many	of	 the	 landing	sites	until	 all	 Japanese	 troops	had	disembarked.4	 In	March	1941,	







bases	of	 French	 colonial	 forces.6	 However,	 Japanese	 troops	were	not	prevented	 from	
leaving	 their	 barracks	 to	 shop,	 eat,	 drink,	 and	 seek	 pleasure	 in	 town.	 They	 were	
occasionally	 reported	 as	 attracting	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 Vietnamese	 population	 by	




















was	 impossible	 to	prevent	everyday	contact	between	 Japanese	 troops	and	 the	French	
population,	 and,	 in	 fact,	 minor	 conflicts	 often	 broke	 out	 between	 them.7	 The	 exact	
number	of	such	conflicts	 is	unknown,	but	about	 twenty	were	recorded	 in	Cochinchina	
for	 a	 one-month	 period	 from	December	 1943	 to	 January	 1944.8	 Many	 of	 these	were	
trivial	insults	exchanged	between	drunken	soldiers	at	night.	However,	as	these	incidents	
threatened	to	break	the	delicate	balance	of	the	Franco-Japanese	coexistence,	they	were	
dealt	 with	 harshly	 by	 authorities	 on	 both	 sides.	 Furthermore,	 when	 objections	 were	
raised	regarding	incidents	instigated	by	the	French,	the	Japanese	side	took	advantage	of	
the	 situation	 and	 increased	 its	 demands	 concerning	 the	 stationing	 of	 its	 troops.	 The	
colonial	 government	 requested	 that	 the	French	population	 remain	 calm	when	dealing	
with	the	Japanese,	advising	that	it	was	best	to	ignore	them	and	avoid	contact	as	much	
as	 possible.9	 When	 incidents	 did	 occur,	 the	 police	 and	 members	 of	 the	 Mission	
Franco-Japonaise,	an	organization	of	French	and	Japanese	authorities	created	to	handle	
issues	 relating	 to	 the	 stationing	of	 Japanese	 troops,	 immediately	 rushed	 to	 the	 scene,	
contained	 the	 damage,	 and	 investigated	 the	 case.	 Perpetrators	 of	 incidents	 were	
severely	punished.	For	example,	in	December	1941,	when	a	Frenchman	threw	a	stone	at	
a	 Japanese	soldier	during	an	argument	 in	a	Hue	bar,	 the	 latter	 immediately	requested	
that	French	authorities	investigate	the	incident,	and	the	Frenchman	was	held	in	jail	for	
thirty	days.10	 	
In	 another	 incident	 in	 Hanoi	 in	 June	 1944,	 some	 Japanese	men	 assaulted	 an	 Air	
France	 pilot.	 The	 pilot	 did	 not	 hesitate	 to	 ask	 for	 forgiveness,	 thus	 containing	 the	
incident.	 However,	 a	 later	 report	 by	 the	 French	 authorities	 displayed	 considerable	
irritation	that	the	Japanese	men	attacked	a	Frenchman	in	public.	It	blamed	the	pilot	for	
not	 resisting	 the	 Japanese	and	criticized	other	French	people	who	were	with	 the	pilot	
for	merely	calling	 the	police	and	not	directly	 involving	 themselves	 in	 the	altercation.11	
Taking	 such	 incidents	 into	 account,	 the	 French	 and	 Japanese	 agreed	 to	 attempt	 to	
prevent	these	conflicts.	For	example,	in	Dalat,	there	was	a	proposal	to	divide	restaurants	
into	 those	 open	 to	 the	 Japanese	 and	 those	 frequented	 by	 the	 French	 or	 locals.12	 In	
Tourane	(Danang),	there	were	fixed	days	when	Japanese	troops	could	head	into	town.13	

















It	 seems	 that	 such	measures	were	 relatively	 successful	 in	 giving	 ordinary	 French	
citizens	the	impression	that	the	day-to-day	Japanese	presence	was	“discreet”	(Jennings	
2011,	 212–213).	 Admittedly,	 many	 of	 the	 French	 considered	 this	 situation	 to	 be	 “an	
invasion	 of	 a	 French	 colony	 by	 Japanese	 troops”15	 and	 looked	 upon	 the	 Japanese	 as	
enemies,	but	they	tended	to	avoid	needless	friction	with	the	Japanese	due	to	the	strict	
measures	of	the	colonial	government	and	their	desires	to	retain	their	relatively	peaceful	







the	 Japanese.	 A	 former	 student	 at	 the	 Nanyô	 gakuin	 (Academy	 of	 South	 Sea)16	 has	
testified	 that	 the	 French	 professors	 there	 appeared	 to	 be	 “wanderers”	without	much	
contact	with	French	society	in	Indochina.17	 At	the	same	time,	since	maritime	trade	with	
Europe	became	unstable	due	to	the	war,	many	French	speakers,	including	intellectuals,	
were	 sent	 from	 Japan	 to	 Indochina	 (which	 represented	France	 in	 the	Far	East),	 and	 it	
seems	they	enjoyed	interacting	with	the	French	there.18	
For	 the	 Japanese,	 too,	 it	 was	 essential	 to	 prevent	 fighting	 to	 maintain	 a	 secure	
military	 base.	 Many	 Japanese	 also	 considered	 Indochina	 “another	 heaven,”	 rich	 and	
untouched	 by	 the	 war.19	 In	 fact,	 the	 material	 wealth	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 French	 and	
Japanese	 alike	 was	 a	 result	 of	 forceful	 exploitation.	 For	 example,	 the	 colonial	
government	made	it	compulsory	for	Vietnamese	peasants	to	sell	rice	directly	to	them	at	
a	fixed,	cheaper-than-market	price,	resulting	in	severe	poverty	for	the	peasants.	It	was	
in	 the	 common	 interest	 of	 both	 the	 French	 and	 Japanese	 to	 share	 the	 “wealth”	 of	
Indochina,	and	so	they	ostensibly	came	to	coexist	“side	by	side”	(Hara	1998,	22–23).	
Further	analysis	of	numerous	trivial	 incidents	that	occurred	over	time	reveals	that	
many	 of	 these	 conflicts	 were	 tied	 to	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 indigenous	 population.	 For	

















who	 happened	 to	 be	 nearby	 intervened.	 These	 incidents	 shook	 the	 generally	
cooperative	 relationship	 maintained	 by	 the	 French	 and	 Japanese,	 revealing	 the	
underlying	 competition	 between	 them.	 Japanese	writer	 Kiyoshi	 Komatsu,	who	was	 in	
Indochina	at	the	time,	witnessed	a	quarrel	between	a	French	officer	and	a	Vietnamese	
man	at	a	restaurant.	He	recorded	in	his	notes	how	the	faces	of	surrounding	Vietnamese	
“appeared	 to	 say	 that	 only	 you	 Japanese	would	 be	 able	 to	 extricate	 the	 unfortunate	
local	from	the	situation”	(Komatsu	1941,	272–273).20	
In	another	case,	a	Vietnamese	life	was	lost	due	to	French	and	Japanese	competition.	
When	 a	 Vietnamese	woman	 employed	 by	 a	 Japanese	 organization	 suffered	 a	 serious	
injury,	a	French	policeman	sought	to	transport	her	to	a	French	medical	facility,	but	the	
Japanese	 intervened	 and	 forcibly	 took	 her	 to	 a	 Japanese	military	 hospital.	Ultimately,	
the	woman	died	because	of	 the	delay	 in	 treatment.	The	dispute	continued	even	after	
her	death,	with	the	Japanese	demanding	that	they	jointly	conduct	her	autopsy,	only	to	
be	refused	by	the	French.21	 Although	this	is	an	extreme	case,	it	indicates	the	reality	of	




In	 this	 way,	 competition	 between	 the	 French	 and	 Japanese	 often	 negatively	
affected	the	Vietnamese	population.	For	example,	when	troubles	occurred	between	the	




documents	 display	 the	 sentiments	 of	 the	 local	 population	 caught	 up	 in	 this	 tense	
situation.	As	one	local	weekly	magazine	described:	
	
It’s	 a	 difficult	 situation	 for	 us	 Vietnamese.	 If	 we	 have	 social	 or	 economic	
relations	 with	 the	 Japanese,	 the	 French	 consider	 us	 traitors	 or	 treat	 us	 even	
worse.	 If	 we	 maintain	 our	 relations	 with	 the	 French,	 the	 Japanese	 will	 be	
suspicious	of	our	hesitation	 toward	 them	and	hold	 a	 grudge	against	us.	What	
are	we	to	do?	Can	we	avoid	any	contact?	We	will	 just	be	considered	cowards.	













On	 the	one	hand,	 the	 French	police	 issued	 threats	 to	 the	 families	 of	Vietnamese	
students	who	attended	 schools	 taught	 in	 Japanese,	which	were	established	 in	 various	
parts	of	Vietnam,	and	pressured	those	working	for	 Japanese	 institutions	to	 leave	their	
jobs. 25 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Japanese	 kempeitai	 (military	 police)	 summoned	 and	
criticized	Vietnamese	publishers	for	producing	works	featuring	“excessive	Francophilia”	
or	 “insufficient	 zeal	 toward	 Japan.”26	 The	 Vietnamese	 population	 thus	 suffered	 from	
the	competition	between	the	French	and	Japanese.	
The	 repercussions	 of	 the	 Franco-Japanese	 coexistence	 did	 not	 stop	 there.	 The	
economic	 agreement	 between	 Japan	 and	 Indochina	 obliged	 the	 latter	 to	 regularly	
export	rice	to	Japan.	In	turn,	the	French	colonial	authorities	wanted	to	strengthen	their	
control	 of	 the	 rice	 market,	 imposing	 a	 system	 of	 compulsory	 purchase	 on	 the	
Vietnamese.	A	crop	failure	brought	on	by	bad	weather	 in	northern	Indochina	between	
the	harvest	of	fall	1944	and	summer	1945	occurred	in	tandem	with	the	Allied	bombing,	
the	 severing	 of	 transportation	 between	 the	 north	 and	 south,	 the	 reduction	 in	 food	
production	 due	 to	 the	military	 demand	 for	 the	 cultivation	 of	 palm	 oil	 and	 fiber,	 and	





As	 these	 numbers	 suggest,	 coexistence	 between	 the	 French	 and	 Japanese	
demonstrated	 latent	 instability.	 To	 partially	 camouflage	 this	 underlying	 tension	 and	
competition,	 the	 collaborative	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 was	 frequently	
strengthened	 in	various	ways.	 It	was	necessary	to	publicly	stress	that	Franco-Japanese	
collaboration	 was	 beneficial	 for	 Indochina,	 rather	 than	 merely	 a	 practical	 choice,	 in	
order	 to	 divert	 popular	 attention	 from	 the	 joint	 rule’s	 contradictions.	 In	 fact,	 the	
headquarters	 of	 the	 Mission	 Franco-Japonaise	 in	 major	 cities	 flew	 flags	 that	 read	
“Service	de	Collaboration,”	as	well	as	the	flags	of	the	two	countries.27	
For	nearly	 five	years,	 the	French	and	 the	 Japanese	 sought	 to	 coexist	by	 finding	a	
balance	 between	 cooperation	 and	 competition.	 Both	 sides	 considered	 their	 rule	 over	





















end	 of	 1943,	 more	 than	 two	 thousand	 students	 had	 completed	 Japanese	 courses	 at	
these	schools.28	 In	July	1944,	five	hundred	students	received	their	diplomas	at	a	grand	
graduation	 ceremony	 held	 at	 the	 Hanoi	 cinema.	 The	 ceremony	 was	 attended	 by	
Japanese	 military	 and	 government	 officials.	 It	 included	 the	 screening	 of	 films	 on	 the	
state	of	education	in	Japan	and	the	Greater	East	Asia	Conference	that	had	been	held	in	
Tokyo	 the	 previous	 year,	 to	 which	 representatives	 from	 Indochina	 had	 not	 been	
invited.29	
Vietnamese	 locals	 attending	 Japanese	 schools	 told	 their	 colleagues	 that	 they	
sought	to	learn	the	language	for	their	own	commercial	or	practical	reasons,	not	because	
they	 felt	 close	 to	 the	 Japanese.30	 There	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 some	 students	 who	
learned	Japanese	out	of	anti-French	sentiment,31	 but	it	can	be	assumed	that	they	went	
largely	 for	 the	 opportunity	 to	 learn	 a	 language	 for	 relatively	 low	 prices	 and	 to	 gain	
access	 to	more	 jobs.	The	 radio	program	that	 Japan	broadcasted	 in	 Indochina	 included	
messages	like	“The	English	and	Americans	will	be	chased	out	of	Southeast	Asia,	and	all	
industry	and	commerce	will	be	in	the	hands	of	the	Japanese”	and	“If	you	learn	Japanese,	
you	 will	 be	 able	 to	 communicate	 throughout	 Asia.”32 	 Furthermore,	 the	 program	
emphasized	the	utility	of	 Japanese	and	the	commonalities	of	kanji	 (Chinese	character)	
culture	between	Japan	and	Vietnam.	 	





participate,”34	 and	 he	 personally	 took	 the	 initiative	 to	 open	 classes	 for	 the	 general	
public	in	Saigon	and	Haiphong.	
With	 troops	 garrisoned	 in	 Indochina,	 the	 local	 population	 was	 employed	 as	













consulates,	 companies,	 and	 newspapers.	 Military	 intelligence,	 the	 embassy,	 and	
consulates	made	use	of	 “unemployed	 intellectuals”	 to	acquire	all	 sorts	of	 information	
about	 Indochina	 (Nguyễn	 1998,	 497).	 However,	 Japan	 was	 unable	 to	 employ	 large	
numbers	of	the	local	population	without	French	permission.	In	October	1942,	when	the	
Japanese	 Army	 employed	 five	 hundred	 Vietnamese	workers	without	 permission	 from	
the	 colonial	 authorities,	 the	 French	 immediately	 opposed	 this	 at	 the	 Mission	
Franco-Japonaise	 and	 demanded	 that	 they	 go	 through	 the	 formalities	 of	 submitting	
documents	 and	 undergoing	 physical	 examinations.35	 The	 French	 colonial	 government	
was	 sensitive	 regarding	 contact	 between	 the	 Japanese	 and	 the	 local	 population	 and	
sought	to	monitor	the	Vietnamese	hired	by	the	Japanese.	 	
The	 Japanese	 Army	was	 not	 permitted	 to	 employ	 locals	 as	 soldiers,	 but	 colonial	
authorities	 permitted	 their	 deployment	 as	 auxiliary	 heiho	 (support	 troops)	 without	
weapons	 under	 certain	 conditions.	 The	 real	 aim	was	 to	 raise	 a	military	 force	 to	 fight	










locals	 involved	 in	 political	 activities.	 The	 army,	 specifically	 the	 kempeitai,	 approached	
Vietnamese	intellectuals	and	independence	activists	to	bring	influential	individuals	over	
to	the	Japanese	side,	shielding	them	from	French	authorities	and	helping	them	go	into	
exile	overseas	 (Tachikawa	2000b,	69–80).	The	kempeitai	 also	established	 ties	with	 the	
political-religious	 Caodaist	 group,	 suppressed	 by	 French	 authorities	 because	 of	 its	
anticolonial	tendencies.	 In	exchange	for	Caodaist	 information	and	 labor,	the	kempeitai	
supported	 Caodaist	 activities	 and	 protected	 the	 group	 from	 the	 French	 colonial	
government	(Tran	1996;	Takatsu	2013;	2014).	
Both	officers	and	soldiers	attempted	to	appeal	individually	to	the	local	population.	
To	 hire	workers,	 one	 Japanese	 officer	 called	 out	 to	 the	 headmen	of	 four	 villages	 and	











would	 take	 control	 of	 all	 of	 Indochina.38	 On	 another	 occasion	 in	 front	 of	 some	
Vietnamese	locals	at	a	hotel	in	Saigon,	a	Japanese	soldier	cracked	an	egg	and	mixed	the	
yolk	and	egg	white	 to	 show	 that	 the	combined	mixture	was	“yellow”	 (Franchini	1977,	
121).	 In	 such	 ways,	 the	 army	 frequently	 intimated	 Japan’s	 support	 for	 Vietnamese	
independence	in	order	to	gain	local	backing.	
Among	 diplomats,	 too,	 there	 were	 those	 who	 proactively	 engaged	 with	 the	
Vietnamese.	Situated	between	the	Japanese	governmental	policy	of	seihitsuhoji	and	its	
stated	goal	of	liberating	Asia,	their	maneuverability	was	restricted.	Many	of	them	were	
fluent	 in	 French,	 allowing	 them	 to	 communicate	 with	 Vietnamese	 intellectuals	 and	
activists.	One	diplomat	at	the	Japanese	embassy	 in	Hanoi	explained	that	while	he	was	
not	 involved	 because	 it	 contravened	 official	 policy,	 many	 of	 his	 colleagues	 were	 in	
frequent	 contact	 with	 Vietnamese	 nationalists	 and	 were	 providing	 them	 support	
(Ishikawa	1996,	47).	At	the	Japanese	consulate	in	Hue,	far	from	the	centers	of	colonial	
governance	 in	 Saigon	 and	Hanoi,	 the	 staff	was	 able	 to	 have	 notable	 contact	with	 the	
Vietnamese.	Vietnamese	seeking	to	acquire	information	from	sources	other	than	official	
publications	 and	 the	 French	 colonial	 government	 often	 entered	 and	 exited	 the	
consulate.39	
As	 long	as	 these	diplomats’	participation	 in	 the	 independence	movement	did	not	
cause	excessive	 friction	with	 the	French,	 it	was	conducted	with	 the	connivance	of	 top	
Japanese	officials.	However,	as	shown	by	the	transfer	of	Minister	Shigenori	Tashiro,	who	
was	deeply	involved	with	members	of	the	pro-Japanese	Việt	Nam	Phục	quốc	Đồng	minh	
Hội	 (Nitz	 1984,	 116),	 their	 activities	 were	 limited	 by	 official	 policy.	 In	 general,	 top	
diplomats	 “did	 no	more	 than	 interact	 superficially	with	 the	 Vietnamese”	 (Nasu	 1963,	
45).	 	
Some	civilians	also	actively	engaged	with	the	Vietnamese.	Mitsuhiro	Matsushita,	a	
representative	 of	 the	 Japanese	 company	 Dainan	 Koosi,	 and	 Mitsuichi	 Yamane,	 a	
Japanese	 industrialist	 supervising	 the	 Indochina	 Economic	 Research	 Institute,	 sought	
contact	 with	 numerous	 Vietnamese	 nationalists	 and	 supported	 their	 activities.	 As	
Matsushita	had	contacts	with	Cường	Để,	a	member	of	the	Vietnamese	royal	family	living	
in	Japan,	he	used	his	considerable	funds	to	support	the	Việt	Nam	Phục	quốc	Đồng	minh	
Hội	 and	Caodaism.	Moreover,	 he	ordered	his	 employees	 to	 shelter	 the	 independence	
activist	Ngô	Đình	Diệm	from	 the	French	police	and	assist	 the	 flight	of	 the	well-known	
intellectual	Trần	Trọng	Kim	from	the	country	(Tachikawa	2000b,	74–76;	Takeuchi	2017,	
45–62).	Caodaism,	which	was	based	in	Tây	Ninh	in	the	south,	was	an	organization	with	
especially	 strong	 ties	 to	 Japan.	 It	 faced	 increasing	 oppression	 from	 French	 authorities	
after	1940,	when	Matsushita	approached	the	religious	organization	 to	provide	various	
forms	of	assistance,	as	well	as	act	as	a	go-between	with	Cường	Để.	The	Japanese	Army,	










Kiyoshi	 Komatsu,	 who	 had	 lived	 in	 France	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 and	 the	 writer	 Ōmi	







122).	 Indeed,	 in	 Hanoi	 in	 the	 autumn	 of	 1943,	 an	 incident	 took	 place	 in	 which	
Vietnamese	 perceived	 to	 be	 pro-Japanese	 were	 rounded	 up	 by	 French	 authorities	
(Shiraishi	 1984,	 36).	 Likewise,	 most	 Vietnamese	 with	 opportunities	 to	 talk	 with	 the	




civilians	 to	become	overly	 involved	with	Vietnamese	activists.	At	 Komaki’s	 urging,	 the	
Hanoi	bureau	chief	of	the	Nichi-Nichi	Shimbun	made	three	Vietnamese	members	of	the	
Đại	 Việt	 Quốc	 dân	 đảng	 correspondents	 for	 the	 paper.	 However,	 one	 of	 them	 was	
arrested	by	French	authorities.	When	the	bureau	chief	learned	of	this,	he	removed	the	
accreditation	 of	 the	 other	 two,	 fearing	 that	 problems	 would	 arise	 with	 the	 French	
authorities.	 The	 Vietnamese	 were	 very	 disappointed	 and	 subsequently	 severed	 their	
connections	with	Komaki.41	
Japan’s	 joint	 rule	 with	 France	 inevitably	 made	 relations	 with	 the	 locals	 seem	
half-hearted.	 Vietnamese	 dissatisfaction	 toward	 the	 attitudes	 of	 the	 Japanese	 was	






than	 three	 thousand	 laborers	 for	 Japanese	 shipyards	 and	 cooperating	 in	 the	
construction	of	wooden	vessels:	 	
	
Seeing	 the	 Japanese	 attitude	 toward	 the	 various	 pro-Japanese	









and	 unwilling	 to	 take	 further	 action	 for	 the	 Japanese.	 The	 Japanese	
made	 many	 promises	 to	 the	 Vietnamese,	 but	 there	 was	 no	
independence	in	sight,	and	whenever	the	Japanese	made	a	concession	








In	 1942,	 many	 Vietnamese	 intellectuals	 had	 become	 close	 to	 the	










told	 us	 that	 we	 were	 working	 for	 Greater	 East	 Asia	 and	 would	 win	
independence	 for	 our	 country….	 But	 the	 situation	 changed	
dramatically….	The	 Japanese	 failed	 to	supply	us	with	enough	 food	and	





















dissemination	 of	 information.	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 many	 looked	 forward	 to	 big	
changes	 with	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	 Japanese.	 However,	 Japan’s	 plan	 for	 seihitsuhoji	 and	
coexistence	 with	 the	 French	 continued	 unaltered	 until	 March	 1945.	 With	 their	
avoidance	of	 friction	with	 the	 French	 colonial	 authorities,	 the	wavering	 relations	with	
the	local	population,	and	the	worsening	living	standards	during	the	period	of	Japanese	
occupation,	 the	 locals’	distrust	of	 the	 Japanese	gradually	 increased.	At	 the	same	time,	
Japan	 loudly	 publicized	 its	 granting	 of	 independence	 to	 the	 Philippines	 and	 Burma	 in	
special	 issues	of	the	magazine	Tân	Á,46	 making	the	contradiction	between	the	Greater	
East	Asian	Co-Prosperity	Sphere	and	seihitsuhoji	even	more	conspicuous.	 	
Whereas	 the	 Japanese	 attempted	 to	 approach	 the	 Vietnamese	 nationalists,	 they	
were	suspicious	of	the	Vietnamese	communists,	who	sought	independence	in	the	near	
future	on	their	own.	As	Japan	and	France	considered	the	Viet	Minh	a	common	enemy,	
the	 two	 powers	 collaborated	 to	 suppress	 their	 activities.	 For	 example,	 in	 September	
1942,	 the	 Japanese	Army	handed	over	a	Viet	Minh	activist	 to	French	authorities,	who	
executed	him.47	 	 	
Some	 Japanese	 were	 aware	 that	 the	 Japanese	 attitude	 toward	 Vietnamese	 was	
inconsistent	and	problematic.	Hisashi	Yamakawa,	a	researcher	at	the	South	Manchurian	
Railway	Company’s	East	Asiatic	Economic	Investigation	Bureau,	noted	in	an	August	1943	
report	 that,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Japanese	 ambiguity	 toward	 the	 Vietnamese	 population,	 of	
which	the	French	took	advantage	to	restrict	Japanese	influence,	many	of	the	indigenous	
population	 who	 had	 high	 hopes	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 occupation	 were	 left	 bitterly	
disappointed	(Mantetsu	Tôa	Keizai	chôsakyoku	1943).	 	





agreement	 between	 our	 emperor	 and	 Pétain….	We	 cannot	 do	 anything	 ourselves.”48	






the	 Vietnamese	 population,	 what	 sort	 of	 relationship	 with	 the	 locals	 did	 the	 French	
seek?	 Japan	had	appealed	 to	 the	Vietnamese	as	 fellow	members	of	greater	East	Asia.	








forced	 to	 reexamine	 their	 approach	 toward	 the	 indigenous	 population.	 The	 colonial	
government	 under	 the	 Vichy	 regime	 had	 begun	 to	 call	 for	 “work,	 family,	 fatherland”	
over	“liberty,	equality,	fraternity”	in	Indochina	as	well	as	in	the	metropole.	In	Vietnam,	
this	government	emphasized	doctrines	of	Vichy	France—hierarchy,	order,	authority,	and	
a	 return	 to	 the	 soil—assuming	 commonalities	 with	 the	 worldview	 of	 traditional	
Confucianism,	and	thereby	sought	 to	attract	 the	attention	of	 the	population	 (Jennings	
2001;	 Verney	 2012).	 An	 article	 in	 the	 journal	 Indochine,	hebdomadaire	 illustré	stated,	
“Work,	 family,	 fatherland.	 These	 slogans	 are	 not	 irrelevant	 to	 us	 Vietnamese.	On	 the	
contrary,	 these	 are	 similar	 to	 the	 four	 duties	 of	 which	 Confucius	 spoke—discipline,	
economy,	 governance,	 and	 tranquility—which	 have	 been	 ours	 for	 many	 years.”49	
Articles	making	 statements	 like	 these	 proliferated,	 reinforcing	 an	 effort	 to	 strengthen	
French	control	by	narrowing	the	gap	between	France	and	its	colony,	heeding	the	views	
of	the	locals	rather	than	unilaterally	imposing	and	asserting	a	French	view	of	civilization.	 	
Under	 the	 slogan	 “France	 and	 Indochina	 drawing	 together,”	 the	 colonial	
government	promoted	affinity	between	 the	 French	and	 the	 local	 population	on	many	
levels,	including	everyday	life.	This	promotion	was	in	response	to	the	Japanese	emphasis	
on	the	gap	between	East	and	West	 in	comparison	to	 the	unity	of	eastern	Asia.	 In	 July	
1942,	 the	 Federal	 Council	 of	 Indochina	 reported	 that	 “on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 valuable	 and	
accurate	 survey	 conducted	 recently	 in	 Tonkin,	 it	 has	 been	 confirmed	 that	 the	 most	
frequent	causes	for	expressions	of	dissatisfaction	among	all	levels	of	Vietnamese	society	
are	 an	 absence	 of	 consideration,	 an	 absence	 of	 empathy,	 or	 simply	 an	 absence	 of	
interest	 by	 Frenchmen	 in	 the	 Indochinese.”50	 Relations	 with	 the	 locals	 were	 revised	
based	on	such	understanding.	 	
This	revision	extended	to	the	terms	used	in	official	discourse.	For	example,	colony	
implied	 exploitation	or	 an	 “unstable	 and	 impermanent	 relationship,”	 and	 its	 use	 was	
therefore	 avoided	 in	 public. 51 	 Moreover,	 indigène	 (indigenous),	 with	 its	 scornful	

























hundred	 French	 citizens	 among	 its	 five	 thousand	members,	 and	 the	 Catholic	 student	
and	 youth	 wing	 had	 two	 hundred	 and	 fifty	 Vietnamese	 and	 French	members	 (Raffin	





Vietnamese	 children.	Although	 they	 shared	 the	 same	 campfire,	 they	 sat	 at	 a	 distance	





across	 a	 variety	 of	 organizations	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Légion	Française	 des	
Combattants	 (French	 Legion	 of	 Combatants),	 the	 largest	 political	 organization	 in	
Indochina.	This	was	a	political	Vichy	organization	that	sought	to	develop	the	révolution	
nationale	(the	official	ideology	of	the	Vichy	government)	and	encourage	the	idolization	
of	 Pétain.	 In	 1943,	 it	 had	more	 than	 seven	 thousand	members,	 but	 all	 of	 them	were	
French.	 Governor	 Decoux	 asked	 the	 metropole	 to	 clarify	 whether	 the	 Légion	 in	 the	
Afrique	Occidentale	Française	 (Algeria)	 should	admit	 the	 locals	 as	members.	 The	 reply	
he	 received	stated	 that	although	 those	 two	colonies	did	 indeed	allow	 for	 the	entry	of	
locals	as	members,	this	was	a	decision	to	be	made	by	the	governor.	As	a	result,	Decoux	





lifestyle.	 Some	 essential	 goods	 began	 to	 be	 rationed	 around	 this	 time,	 even	 for	 the	
French,	who	despised	queuing	with	the	local	population.	The	Hanoi	administration	that	









population	was	 resulting	 in	 the	 French	 losing	 their	 authority”55	 and	 so	 experimented	
with	distributing	commodities	to	the	French	and	locals	on	different	days.56	 	
Despite	such	 limitations	on	everyday	contact,	 the	new	measures	 launched	by	 the	
colonial	 authorities	 had	 the	 effect	 of	 stimulating	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 Vietnamese	




of	 the	 Vichy	 regime,	 and	 this	 youth	movement	was	 introduced	 into	 Indochina	 (Raffin	




amicable	 relations	 to	 develop	 between	 them	 and	 the	 French	 (Ducoroy	 1949,	 39).	 By	
February	1944,	around	about	six	hundred	thousand	young	people	were	participating	in	
the	youth	movement	in	Indochina	(Raffin	2005,	5).	
Connected	 to	 this	 youth	 movement	 was	 the	 popularity	 of	 sports	 events.	 The	
colonial	authorities	were	concerned	about	the	Vietnamese	competing	with	the	French	
because	they	were	unsure	about	 the	scope	of	 their	abilities,	but	 they	planned	various	
events	 in	 the	 hope	 that	 it	 would	 “keep	 the	 Indochinese	 youth	 away	 from	 Japanese	
propaganda”	(Ducoroy	1949,	39).	In	light	of	this	large-scale	youth	movement	developed	
by	the	French,	the	Japanese	asked	the	French	colonial	authorities	for	permission	to	also	
compete	 in	 certain	 athletic	 events,	 such	 as	 swimming	 and	 gymnastics,	 two	 sports	 in	
which	the	Japanese	excelled.	However,	seeking	to	monopolize	the	attention	of	youth	in	
Indochina,	the	French	refused	the	request	obliquely,	permitting	Japanese	participation	
only	 in	 events	 like	 bicycling	 and	 pelota,	 in	 which	 they	 had	 little	 experience.	 Soon	
thereafter,	the	French	colonial	authorities	notified	their	regional	administrators	to	never	
accept	the	Japanese	demand	to	participate	in	sporting	events	without	the	permission	of	




All	of	 these	new	activities	 for	 the	 indigenous	youth—the	disciplining	of	 the	body,	

















other	 way	 of	 keeping	 the	 youths	 on	 the	 French	 side	 and	 away	 from	 Japanese	
influence.60	 After	 the	 end	 of	 French	 rule	 on	 March	 9,	 1945,	 and	 the	 subsequent	
termination	of	Japanese	occupation	with	Japan’s	defeat	on	August	15,	the	Vietnamese	






9,	 1945.	 As	 it	 became	 clear	 in	 1943	 that	 the	 Axis	 powers	 were	 in	 an	 unfavorable	
situation,	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 futsuinshori	 began	 to	 be	 discussed	 in	 Tokyo	 that	 fall.	
Although	the	Japanese	military	acknowledged	the	need	for	a	coup,	 its	 implementation	
was	postponed	 to	 allow	 for	 a	 full	 focus	on	 the	Philippines	 campaign.	When	 the	Allies	
liberated	France	 in	 the	 summer	of	1944,	and	 the	Vichy	government	 fell,	 the	 Japanese	
became	skeptical	about	the	Indochinese	colonial	authorities’	“cooperation	with	Japan.”	
Moreover,	 despite	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 Allied	 plan	 for	 landing	 in	 Indochina,	 Japan	 deemed	
such	a	 landing	imminent	 in	 light	of	 intensifying	aerial	bombing	in	Indochina	and	finally	
decided	 to	 eliminate	 French	 suzerainty	 by	 force	 in	 January	 1945	 (Akagi	 1984,	 46–48;	
Shiraishi	and	Furuta	1976,	10–19).	
We	can	trace	the	meeting	between	France,	Vietnam,	and	Japan	back	to	the	Đông	
Du	 movement	 formed	 by	 Phan	 Bội	 Châu	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century.	 Nearly	 two	
hundred	Vietnamese	youths	 from	this	movement	saw	hope	 in	 Japan	as	 the	 first	Asian	
country	to	“modernize”	and	studied	there	for	the	sake	of	future	independence.	But	the	
movement	 was	 dissolved	 in	 1909	 by	 the	 Japanese	 government,	 which	 prioritized	 its	
relationship	 with	 France	 (Shiraishi	 1993).	 This	 “imperialist	 complicity”	 of	 France	 and	
Japan	with	regard	to	Indochina	took	on	added	complexity	when	it	came	into	play	again	
during	the	Second	World	War.	
Although	 the	 French	 and	 the	 Japanese	 in	 Indochina	 had	minor	 conflicts	 at	 times,	
they	 coexisted	 while	 minimizing	 friction	 as	 they	 prioritized	 their	 respective	 interests.	
They	also	explored	ways	to	interact	with	the	Vietnamese,	because	both	foreign	groups	













since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 but	 the	 ambition	 to	 gain	 total	 support	
from	the	local	population	was	constantly	obstructed	by	Japan’s	own	imperialist	policies.	
By	contrast,	the	French	tried	to	approach	the	Vietnamese	based	on	Vichy	ideology,	and	




Meanwhile,	 the	 Viet	 Minh	 steadily	 expanded	 the	 scope	 of	 its	 activities,	 taking	
advantage	of	the	turbulent	period	when	Japanese	troops	were	stationed	 in	 Indochina,	
and	 gained	 the	 support	 of	 the	 population,	which	 suffered	 under	 the	worsening	 living	
conditions	 caused	 by	 Franco-Japanese	 coexistence.	 The	 French	 system	of	 control	was	
terminated	with	the	futsuinshori	in	March	1945,	but	Japan	had	little	capability	to	collect	
information	 about	 Viet	 Minh	 activities,	 which	 allowed	 the	 Viet	 Minh	 to	 decisively	






By	 April	 1946,	 both	 the	 British	 and	 Chinese	 militaries	 had	 withdrawn	 from	
Indochina,	and	France	started	a	full-scale	comeback,	dispatching	more	and	more	troops.	
The	 Viet	 Minh	 reacted	 furiously	 to	 the	 return	 of	 France,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 the	 First	
Indochinese	 War	 broke	 out	 at	 the	 end	 of	 1946.	 France	 failed	 to	 reestablish	 stable	
control	of	Indochina	and	was	forced	to	end	the	conflict,	withdrawing	entirely	in	1954.	As	
we	have	seen,	therefore,	the	beginning	of	the	end	of	French	rule	can	be	traced	back	to	
this	decisive	period	of	Franco-Japanese	coexistence	during	the	Second	World	War.	
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